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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
AMY J. WALTERS,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
NATIONAL BEVERAGES, INC., a
corporation, and STREATOR CHEVROLET COMPANY, a corporation,

Case
No. 10582

Defendants and Respondents.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STREATOR CHEVROLET COMPANY
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is a contract action in which plaintiff has sued
defendants for breach of a contract respecting the award
of prizes in a sweepstakes drawing contest.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The trial court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks to have the summary judgment set aside
and the case remanded for trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Those facts set forth in appellant's statement of facts
are accurate. However, certain other undisputed facts
must be brought to the attention of the court in addition
to those stated by appellant.
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Appellant gave the following pertinent testimony as to
her understanding and intention with respect to the
drawing (R.41, pp. 26 & 27):
"Q Mrs. Walters, directing your attention to the
time prior to the drawing at the Streator Chevrolet
Company, and particularly to the times during which
you were making out and depositing entry blanks, now,
during that period of time did you have an understand·
ing as to whether or not the prizes were to be awarded
in the exact sequence of the tickets drawn?

A I took it that they would be drawn as it looked
like it said on the entry blank.

Q Well, I A And I certainly prayed my name would be drawn
first.
Q Well, what I want to know is what your understanding was.
A

That's how I understood it.

Q

And you expected that at the time of the drawing

at the Streator Chevrolet Company, the first prize
would be drawn first, the second second, and so on
through the whole of the 25 or 26 prizes; is that true?
Yes.
Q And that was your understanding when you-

A

A

The highest value first.

Q And was that your understanding when you prepared, made out and deposited all of the entry tickets
which you did prepare, make out and deposit?
A That's right. I wouldn't have bothered with it if
I had known it was otherwise.
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Q I see. But that was your clear understanding?
A Yes.
Q Now, did that understanding change at any time
prior to the contest?
A

No."

Respondents' intention and understanding is set forth
in the following paragraph of the affidavit of Mr. Trager,
a managing agent (R. 7 & 8):
"6. That at the time the general offer was first made
by defendants to award the listed prizes to the winners
of the drawing and at all times subsequent thereto defendants understood and intended that the order of
drawing was to be that selected by them, and defendants had no reason to suppose that plaintiff had a different understanding of the offer."
The order of drawing selected by defendants was, as
indicated in appellant's brief, five Pepsi-Cola winners
first, then the fifth prize winner, five more Pepsi-Cola
winners, then the fourth prize winner, etc., with the last
ticket drawn being the winner of the first prize.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
NO VALID CONTRACT WAS MADE BETWEEN
PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANTS WITH RESPECT TO
THE SWEEPSTAKES DRAWING BECAUSE THE
PARTIES HAD A DIFFERENT INTENT AND UNDERSTANDING WITH RESPECT TO A MATERIAL ELEMENT, THE ORDER OF DRAWING.
This defendant does not deny that a unilateral general
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offer was made by the defendants. The terms of that
offer are contained on Exhibit P-1 (R. 33) which is the
entry blank. This defendant further agrees that a contract can be formed by the unconditional acceptance of a
unilateral offer, and that the acceptance may be made by
the act of the offeree in properly filling out a contest
blank and depositing it for drawing for prizes.
However, even when the purported offer is relatively
uncomplicated, and the acceptance may be by the doing
of a simple act, all other elements necessary to the formation of a contract must be present. For example, there
must be a legal consideration, mutual assent or meeting
of the minds, reasonable certainty as to material terms,
and absence of extrinsic fraud, duress or illegality.
This respondent bases this point of its argument on
the proposition that the offer is either silent, uncertain,
or ambiguous with respect to the order in which the
prizes were to be assigned to the tickets drawn, or, if one
prefers, the order in which the tickets being drawn were
to be assigned to the prizes. With the offer being thus
lacking in clarity, reasonable minds could come to different, yet reasonable, conclusions as to the order of
assignment of prizes or tickets, and each could intend
different terms. If each party intended the same order
of assignment of prizes, a contract would result, but if
each party, without knowledge of the differing intendment of the other, had a different understanding as to
the order of assignment of prizes to tickets drawn, the
requisite mutual assent, meeting of the minds, would be
missing and no contract would be formed.
In the instant case the offer consisted of Ex. P-1 (R.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5

33), which is the entry blank. It is specified in the offer
that the Corvair coupe was to be first prize and the other
four major prizes were to be those thus designated. The
offer then said "the next 20 winners each receive 12 cases
of Pepsi-Cola." The only reference in Ex. P-1 to the
manner of selection of winners is the statement:
"4. Winners will be selected by a drawing to be
held at Streator Chevrolet, 3: 00 p.m., Nov. 28, 1964."
There is a significant difference between a designation
of the order and rank of the prizes being awarded (that
is, which shall be the first, which, the second, and so
forth) and a designation of the manner by which the one
who is to have the prize shall be selected. The reference
to the "next 20 winners" referred to, and was a part of,
the designation of the order and rank of the prizes, i.e.,
which prize shall take which place in the order of ranking. The statement "Winners will be selected by a drawing" is a designation of the manner in which the winners
are to be selected. Nowhere in the offer is there a statement as to which ticket drawn shall be given which prize.
The undisputed evidence in this case is that the offeror
intended and believed that it reserved the right and
power to designate the order in which the tickets drawn
should be assigned to the prizes, and that the offeree,
Mrs. Walters, intended and believed that the first ticket
drawn would, as a matter of contract, get the "First
Prize." She did not intend that Streator Chevrolet have
any power or right to designate a different order of assigning prizes, no matter how fair or impartial the
method to be designated may be.
The record on this point is short and clear. Mrs. Wal-
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ters' position is stated in her disposition (R.41, pp. 26 &
27), which reads as follows:
"Q Mrs. Walters, directing your attention to the
time prior to the drawing at the Streator Chevrolet
Company, and particularly to the times during which
you were making out and depositing entry blanks, now,
during that period of time did you have an understanding as to whether or not the prizes were to be awarded
in the exact sequence of the tickets drawn?

A I took it that they would be drawn as it looked
like it said on the entry blank.
Q Well, I A And I certainly prayed that my name would be
drawn first.
Q Well, what I want to know is what your understanding was.
A

That's how I understood it.

Q And you expected that at the time of the drawing
at the Streator Chevrolet Company, the first prize
would be drawn first, the second second, and so on
through the whole of the 25 or 26 prizes; is that true?
A Yes.
Q And that was your understanding when you-

A

The highest value first.

Q And was that your understanding when you
prepared, made out and deposited all of the e~try
tickets which you did prepare, make out and deposit?
A That's right. I wouldn't have bothered with it if
I had known it was otherwise.
Q I see. But that was your clear understanding?
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A

Yes.

Q Now, did that understanding change at any time
prior to the contest?
A

No."

The defendants' position is clearly stated in the affidavit of Mr. Trager, a managing agent (R. 7 & 8). It is
uncontested and reads as follows:
"6. That at the time the general offer was first made

by defendants to award the listed prizes to the winners

of the drawing and at all times subsequent thereto
defendants understood and intended that the order of
drawing was to be that selected by them, and defendants had no reason to suppose that plaintiff had a different understanding of the offer."

None of the parties claims the other to have been
aware of the difference in their understandings of the
purport of their supposed agreement.
Under these circumstances is there a legal contract
between plaintiff and defendants that the first ticket
drawn shall be the winner of the first prize and the
second ticket drawn the winner of second prize? We
think not. The texts and cases hold that, under such
circumstances as are here present, the law recognizes in
favor of each of the parties the meaning he or she had
intended, and no contract has been made.

Williston on Contracts, Third Edition, Sec. 95 states:
"***If every word and every act had but one permissible meaning, it would not be necessary in considering the formation of contracts to inquire into the
intent of a speaker or actor; but since this is not the
case, if an expression, in view of the circumstances
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under which it is used, may fairly mean either of two
things, each party, unless he is in some way responsibie
for the error, may attach his own interpretation. There.
fore, where a phrase of a contract has no obvious mean.
ing, or is reasonably capable of different interpreta.
tions, and is in fact differently understood, there is no
contract. The error in language may relate to the object
to which the apparent agreement relates, it may relate
to the persons with whom it is made, or to any of i~
terms.***"
A portion of Note 5 to the above quoted text gives a
specific example as follows:
"In Peerless Glass Co. v. Pacific Crokery Co. 12!
Cal. 641, 54 P. 101, plaintiff replied to an inquil')
'freight allowance from Converse 74 cts.' The defendanl
understood this was the freight rate, the inquirer thal
it was a discount. The court held it could not say thal
these words justified one interpretation more than the
other, therefore, there was no contract."
Section 605 of Williston on Contracts, Third Edition.
includes the following text on pages 360 and 361 thereof

"It may be supposed that A used the words in a
sense different from that in which B understood them
but that A had no reason to suppose that his under·
standing would not also be B's, and B on his part haa
no reason to suppose that his understanding would nol
also be A's. In such a case, the law recognizes in favor
of each party the meaning he intended, therefore, no
contract has been made. The same rule applies where
both parties know or have reason to know of the
ambiguity."
The American Law Institute Restatement of the Law
of Contracts, Sec. 71, provides as follows:
"Except as stated in Secs. 55, 70, the undisclosed
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understanding of
own words and
the other party's
in the formation
and in no others:

either party of the meaning of his
other acts, or of the meaning of
words and other acts, is material
of contracts in the following cases

"(a) If the manifestations of intention of either
party are uncertain or ambiguous, and he has no reason
to know that they may bear a different meaning to
the other party from that which he himself attaches
to them, his manifestations are operative in the formation of a contract only in the event that the other party
attaches to them the same meaning.***"
This court, speaking in the case of E. B. Wicks Co. v.
Moyle, 137 P.2d 342, 103 Ut. 554, decided in 1943, affirmed
the above rules as prevailing in Utah by holding as
follows:
" 'In order that there may be an agreement, the parties must have a distinct intention common to both and
without doubt or difference. Until all understand alike,
there can be no assent, and, therefore, no contract.
Both parties must assent to the same thing in the same
sense, and their minds must meet as to all the terms.
If any portion of the proposed terms is not settled, or
no mode is agreed on by which it may be settled, there
is no agreement, although it is not necessary that all
of the terms of the contract be settled by a single act,
but the parties may settle on one term at a time, and
their contract becomes complete when the last term is
agreed on.' 17 C.J.S., Contracts, Sec. 31, p. 359."
Newton Oil Co. v. Bockhold, et al, 176 P.2d 904, 115
Colo. 510, (1946) holds as follows:

"A fundamental contractual requirement is that of
certainty. The minds of the parties must have met.
Where one party may have intended a certain obliga-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10

tion, and the other party intended a different one, an1
from the wording of the instrument itself there is nr
rule by which the true intention can be determinee
no contract results. 'The offer must not merely be con:
plete in terms, but the terms must be sufficiently deli
nite to enable the court to determine whether the con
tract has been performed or not.' 1 Page on the La~
of Contracts, page 135, Sec. 95. 'As a promise ma1
insufficiently specify the prices to be paid, so the co~
sideration for which the price is to be paid may be let
equally uncertain, and in such a case it is not usuall1
possible to invoke the standard of reasonableness ~
order to give the promise sufficient definiteness l!
make it enforceable.' 1 Williston on Contracts, Re
vised Edition, page 119, Sec. 42. 'The court can suppl:
some elements in a contract, but they cannot mab
one; and when the language in a contract is too un
certain to gather from it what the parties intended
the courts cannot enforce it.' Ryan v. Hanna, 89 Wash
379, 154 P. 436. 'A court will not undertake to enforce
a contract, unless by some lawful means it can ascer·
tain and know just what the contract bound each parlj
to do.' Lester v. Hinkle, 193 Ind. 605, 141 N.E. 463, 46~
'An offer must be so definite in its terms, or require
such definite terms in the acceptance, that the promise>
and performances to be rendered by each party an
reasonably certain.' Restatement of the Law-Con·
tracts, p. 40, Sec. 32.''

Richards v. Kuppinger, 278 P.2d, 395, 46 Wash. 2d 6i
( 1955), shows the law of that state to be in accord wilt
the above. In that case the court states:
"It is perfectly clear that there was no meeting ol
the minds between appellant and respondent, ano
hence no express contract of sale. Nor can we find an!.
'implied contract' between them. Both express ano
implied contracts grow out of the intention of the
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contracting parties and in each case there must be a
meeting of the minds before there can be a contract.
McKevitt v. Golden Age Breweries, 14 Wash. 2d 50,
126 P.2d 1077; Troyer v. Fox, 162 Wash. 537, 298 P. 733,
77 A.L.R. 1132."
It was, of course, incumbent upon the offerors to select
a method of assigning prizes to tickets that is honest,
fair and equitable. The method chosen and used was
openly announced and publicized on the day of the drawing and well ahead of the drawing. No person objected.
So far as respondents know, appellant does not urge that
the method selected was unfair, rather, she urges that
the method chosen was not that provided by the contract.
It is difficult to suppose that plaintiff would urge that
the offer bound the offeror to award first prize to the
holder of the first ticket drawn if she had been the owner
of the twenty-sixth ticket drawn instead of the second.

The argument above is directed to the contentions of
Point I and Point II of appellant's brief. Point III is discussed by the respondent, National Beverages, Inc., in
its brief. This respondent adopts and includes herein by
reference the arguments and authorities set forth in the
brief of the respondent, National Beverages, Inc.
CONCLUSION
Respondent, Streator Chevrolet Company, contends
that the question of whether the document constituting
the offer in this case is silent, uncertain or ambiguous
with respect to the order of drawing may be determined
by the court as a matter of law and is not an issue of
fact. Admittedly this document constitutes the only rep-
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resentation of the terms of offer relied upon by appellant
The trial court has decided this question of law in favor
of respondents. The trial court further determined that
the differing intendments and understandings of the
parties on the point at issue precluded the formation of
a contract between them. With these issues thus determined, the trial court properly granted respondents'
motion for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth
in the briefs of the respondents, the decision of the trial
court should be affirmed, with costs to respondents.
Respectfully submitted,

EARL D. TANNER
Counsel for Respondent
Streator Chevrolet Company
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